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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
AND PARENTAL RIGHTS ACT
The Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act, signed into law
March 20, 1973,1 has substantially altered procedures relating to
adoption and custody in Washington. Both parents of an illegitimate
child now have primary right to custody of the child. The putative
father now is entitled to notice of those proceedings which may per-
manently terminate his parental rights, including a hearing to deter-
mine the necessity of his consent to his child's adoption. In addition,
a putative father now stands on an equal footing with the child's natural
mother when seeking custody of his child at a filiation proceeding.
I. BACKGROUND
In Stanley v. Illinois2 the Supreme Court greatly expanded the
rights of putative fathers. The Court found that an Illinois statute that
deprived a putative father of notice and the opportunity to establish
his fitness for custody in a permanent dependency proceeding denied
him due process and equal protection of the law.3 In subsequent cases
1. Popularly known as the Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act, Sen-
ate Bill No. 2459, ch. 134, [1973] Wash. Laws, is actually a mixed bag of amend-
ments and additions to existing legislation. Its provisions amend WASH. REV. CODE §§
26.24.190 (1963) (custody in filiation proceeding); 26.32.030 (1963) (when consent
to adopt is required); 26.32.040 (1963) (when consent to adopt is not required);
26.32.050 (1963) (finding of the court as to consent requirement); 26.32.080 (1963)
(adoption notice, form and service) and add to WASH. REV. CODE chs. 26.32 (1963)
(adoption); 26.37 (1963) (protection of orphaned, homeless or neglected chil-
dren). Labeled as emergency legislation, the Act went into effect immediately.
2. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
3. Peter Stanley, the acknowledged father of three illegitimate children, lived
with Joan Stanley intermittently for 18 years. The couple never married. When Joan
died, the two youngest children became wards of the state and were placed with
court appointed guardians pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 37, §§ 702-05 (1972). After hearing Stanley's argument that he had not been shown
to be an unfit parent and that neither married fathers nor unwed mothers could be
deprived of their children without such a showing, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that the statutory distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was ration-
ally related to the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act and that Stanley could prop-
erly be separated from his children on mere proof that he and the dead mother had
not been married. In re. Stanley, 45 I11. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered two essentially
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the Court indicated that the protections of Stanley were applicable to
adoption proceedings and custody disputes. 4
The Stanley analysis suggested that Washington's adoption statute
discriminated against putative fathers on two levels. First, by expressly
providing that a putative father need not consent to his child's adop-
tion, it denied him rights guaranteed to married parents, unwed
mothers and divorced parents. 5 The statute thereby deprived fathers
of illegitimate children of equal protection of the law. Second, the
statute presumed an unmarried father to be an unfit parent and there-
fore not entitled to notice of his child's adoption. A By denying a puta-
separable holdings. First, the Court held that Stanley had a "cognizable and substan-
tial" (405 U.S. at 652) private interest-"that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, [which] undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful counter-
vailing interest, protection." Id. at 651. In view of the father's interest and the state's
declared goals of protecting the welfare and strengthening the family ties of minors.
the Supreme Court concluded that the state cannot simply presume that unmarried
fathers are unsuitable without giving them an opportunity to establish themselves as fit
parents. Under the due process clause, the state's interest in presuming rather than
proving a putative father's unfitness as a parent "is insufficient to justify refusing a
father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family." Id. at
658.
Second, the Supreme Court held that since Illinois assumes custody of the chil-
dren of married parents, divorced parents or unwed mothers only after a hearing and
proof of neglect, the failure to provide unwed fathers with a similar hearing on fit-
ness constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. Id.
4. In Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan,
405 U.S. 1051 (1972) vacating and remanding sub. nom. State ex rel. Lewis v.
Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Stanley a Wisconsin Su-
preme Court decision holding a putative father not entitled to notice of the adop-
tion of his child or an opportunity to show his fitness as a parent. On remand, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court vacated the adoption and placed the child in the custody
of the putative father. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin
and Upper Michigan, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973). Other state courts have
applied the reasoning of Stanley to adoption. See, e.g., People ex rel. Slawek v. Cove-
nant Children's Home, 52 III. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972); Doe v. Dept. of Social
Services, 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972). In Vanderlaan v.
Vanderlaan, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding 126 III. App. 2d 410.
262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded an Illinois cus-
tody determination to be considered in light of Stanley. On remand, the putative
father was successful in maintaining custody of his illegitimate children. Vanderlaan v.
Vanderlaan, 9 II. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.030 (1963) stated that written consent to adoption
need be filed prior to a hearing to adopt as follows:
(2) If the person to be adopted is of legitimate birth, or legitimized thereafter,
and a minor, then by each of his parents, except as hereinafter provided;
(3) If the person to be adopted is illegitimate and a minor, then by his moth-
er, if living.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040 (1963) adds: "No consent for the adoption of a minor
shall be required as follows: . . .(5) From a father of an illegitimate child."
6. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.050 (1963) provides for a hearing to determine
whether the consent of a parent is required pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.040
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tive father notice and an opportunity to establish himself as a fit parent,
the statute deprived him of due process of law.
One section of Washington's filiation statute also was open to at-
tack under the rationale of Stanley.7 The filiation statute gave mothers
of illegitimate children an inordinate advantage in custody hearings
by forcing putative fathers to bear the nearly impossible burden of
proving the child's mother unsuitable. By treating unwed fathers as
less suitable parents than unwed mothers, the statute denied putative
fathers equal protection of the law.8
The Washington Court of Appeals, noting the constitutional protec-
tions of Stanley, recognized the problems inherent in the adoption and
filiation statutes but hesitated "to unravel the complexities involv-
ed . . . ."9 With the realization that the adoption and filiation statutes
(1963), supra note 5. The statute also states: "[T] he father of an illegitimate child
shall not be entitled to notice of such hearing." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.080 (1963),
in detailing requirements of notice, form and service of summons, continued the ex-
clusion of putative fathers: "(5) If the court is satisfied of the illegitimacy of the
child to be adopted, and so finds, no notice to the father of such child shall be
made."
The Adoption Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.32 (1963), confers power to decree
adoptions in the Washington Superior Court. In addition, the Juvenile Court has
power to place children found to be "wards of the state" (dependent children) with
approved agencies. See WASH. Rnv. CODE § 13.04.110 (1963). Although the Juvenile
Court Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 13.04 (1963), does not expressly distinguish be-
tween married and unmarried fathers, the Juvenile Court of Washington did not ex-
tend notice to unwed fathers prior to Stanley.
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190 (1963) provided that after filiation proceedings
have been initiated and the father of the child identified, custody of the child shall be
delivered to the mother, providing she is a "suitable person." If she is not a suitable
person, "the court may deliver the care and custody of such child to any reputable
person, including the accused, charitable or state institution."
It is questionable whether the courts actually did consider the possibility that the
mother is unsuitable despite charges from the father to that effect. "Indeed, it is not
uncommon for a court to rest its decision on the axiom that the child's welfare and
the mother's right to custody are always synonymous." Tabler, Paternal Rights in
the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of The Unwed Father,
11 J. FAMILY L. 231, 242 (1971).
It will be noted that WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190 (1963) gave a putative father
no priority over other interested parties such as charitable or state institutions. Even
those in the nebulous category of "any reputable person" stood on equivalent footing
with putative fathers. Despite the language of the statute, the Washington Supreme
Court held that when the mother of an illegitimate child dies, the putative father, if a
fit and proper parent and the welfare of the child permits, has rights to custody and
control over the child as against all others. In re Moore's Estate, 68 Wn. 2d 792,
415 P.2d 653 (1966).
8. See note 3 supra.
9. In re the Guardianship of Gloria Lee Harp, 6 Wn. App. 701, 704, 495 P.2d
1059, 1062 (1972). The Washington Court of Appeals stated: "Obviously, the
[state's] filiation and adoption statutes are now unconstitutional insofar as they fail
to recognize the newly determined constitutional rights of the putative father." Id.
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were obviously unconstitutional came predictable judicial and admin-
istrative confusion. Although the Illegitimate Children and Parental
Rights Act has effectively eliminated some areas of uncertainty, ines-
capable problems continue to pervade the areas of adoption and filia-
tion. This note will explore these problems, suggest solutions, examine
the scope of a putative father's new rights and discuss some'additional
steps the practitioner now must take to execute a valid adoption.
II. FILIATION
A filiation proceeding is a special statutory proceeding to establish
paternity and the father's duty to support his illegitimate child.' 0 As
part of a filiation proceeding, the court awards custody of the child.
The new amendment to the filiation statute removes the requirement
that an unwed father seeking custody of his child demonstrate that the
mother is unsuitable. The sole criterion for determining custody is the
welfare of the child, the putative father now having an equal oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that he is "more fit as a parent." However, the
court retains the power to find both parents unfit and to grant custody
to a reputable person or public or private agency. "
The exact legal character of the award of custody included in a filia-
tion judgment is uncertain. Presumably, it is a custody award similar
in nature to that which occurs after dissolution of marriage. If so, a
filiation judgment could terminate a putative father's legal interest in
his child; if the decree awarded him no right of visitation, control or
custody nor imposed on him any obligation to support his child, he
would not retain his power to withhold consent to his child's adoption.' 2
This dictum is contrary to previous Washington authority. See In re Blake, 21 Wn.
2d 547, 151 P.2d 825 (1944).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (4th ed. 1951).
11. Ch. 134, § 1, [1973] Wash. Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.190
(1963). The amendment also allows the child to be given the surname which the
court in its discretion finds is in the best interests of the child. The previous un-
amended statute vested power in the court to order "that the surname of the ac-
cused shall henceforth be the lawful surname of such child." The amended section
seems to imply that the natural mother can no longer insist that the child be given the
father's surname. The court would appear still to have discretion, however, to allow
an agreement between the parents to name the child after the father (or mother)
provided such agreement is in the best interests of the child.
12. Under the equal protection reasoning of Stanley, see note 3 supra, a puta-
tive father who has retained some interest in his child, see note 13 and accompany-
ing text infra, necessarily will maintain the right to petition to modify the custody
650
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Although specifically mentioning only divorce, separate maintenance
and annulment, the exception in the adoption statute requiring no
consent from the parent judicially deprived of custody should logically
encompass a decree of custody in a filiation proceeding. To argue that
a putative father, whose rights and obligations toward his child have
been terminated in a filiation proceeding, retains the right to refuse to
consent to his child's adoption would be to give him a position superior
to that of the divorced father, whose power to withhold consent is lost
under similar circumstances. 13
A divorced parent with visitation rights possesses sufficient interest
in the child to require his consent for the child's adoption. 14 If the
court interprets the filiation award of custody as being similar in na-
ture to a divorce award of custody, the question whether the putative
father has a right to visitation may become extremely important in
determining the necessity of his consent prior to the adoption of the
child. Visitation rights of putative fathers increasingly have been rec-
ognized where such continued contact would be in the best interests of
the child. 15 Although the amendment to the filiation statute fails to
provide for such visitation rights, it would not be in keeping with the
spirit of the new section on filiation to fail to recognize such rights
judicially. 16
decree. See, e.g., Holten v. Holten, 64 Wn. 2d 203, 390 P.2d 982 (1964) (custody
provisions of a divorce decree may be modified as circumstances may require); State
ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wn. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945) (the welfare
of the child is of paramount importance in determining who is entitled to the custody
of illegitimate as well as legitimate children).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040(2) (1963). The court has stated that WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.32.040(2) (1963) protects the rights only of a parent who has
exhibited sufficient interest in his child at the time of divorce or subsequent mod-
ification to secure an affirmative grant of some right of custody, control or visi-
tation or who has been required by decree to make support payments. Where none
of the above rights and duties exist, the exception to the consent requirement is
applicable. In re Candell, 54 Wn. 2d 276, 282, 340 P.2d 173, 177 (1959).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See, e.g., In re the Guardianship of Gloria Lee Harp, 6 Wn. App. 701, 706,
495 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1972) citing Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 887 (1967). Harp contained
a rather significant comment on a putative father's right to visitation, the importance
of which was overshadowed by the Stanley dictum, see note 9 and accompanying
text supra. The court noted that the father of an illegitimate child may be granted
visitation rights where custody has been awarded to the mother, provided the best
interests of the child permitted.
16. If a putative father cannot secure custody during a filiation proceeding, but
does not wish his child relinquished for adoption without his consent, he could ask
the court to grant him a right to visitation or else to impose a nominal support
judgment, preserving sufficient interest in his child to avoid the operation of WASH.
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III. CONSENT TO ADOPTION
Consent to the adoption of an illegitimate child must now be se-
cured from both natural parents.' 7 The adoption statute as amended
retains as exceptions from this consent requirement: 18
(1) [A] parent deprived of civil rights when in a hearing. . . the court
finds that the circumstances surrounding the loss of said parent's civil
rights were of such a nature that the welfare of the child would be best
served by a permanent deprivation of parental rights;
(2) [A] parent who has been deprived of the custody of the child...
after notice: Provided, That a decree in an action for divorce, separate
maintenance, or annulment, which grants to a parent any right of cus-
tody, control, or visitation of a minor child, or requires of such parent
the payment of support money for such child, shall not constitute such
deprivation of custody;
(3) [A] parent who, more than one year prior to filing of a petition
hereunder, has been adjudged to be mentally ill or otherwise mentally
incompetent, and who has not thereafter been restored to competency
by the court making such adjudication, and the court at a hearing
called for such purpose . . . finds that the best interests of the child
will be served by permanent deprivation of custody;
(4) [A] parent who has been found . . . upon notice as herein pro-
vided to such parent, to have deserted or abandoned such child under
circumstances showing a willful substantial lack of regard for parental
obligations.
The amended statute, however, additionally provides that consent is
not required: ' 9
(5) From a parent of an illegitimate child who prior to entry of the
interlocutory decree of adoption has not contested the proposed adop-
tion after having been provided with notice of a hearing on an adop-
tion petition pursuant to the notice provisions of section 6 of this
1973 amendatory act;
REV. CODE § 26.32.040(2) (1963). If the mother died, relinquished the child for
adoption or abandoned the child, the father would retain his right to establish him-
self as a fit parent.
17. Ch. 134, § 2, [1973] Wash. Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.030
(1963).
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(6) From a parent who has surrendered the child pursuant to section 7
of this 1973 amendatory act.
Subsection 5 provides for a show cause hearing prior to entry of the
decree of adoption. If, after proper notice,2 0 the parent of an illegiti-
mate child fails to appear and contest the adoption, then his or her
consent is no longer required.21 Subsection 6 simply incorporates pre-
viously existing case and statutory law into a statutory consent excep-
tion.22 These new statutory procedures create several problems.
The adoption statute as amended clearly requires a putative father's
consent to his child's adoption. The statute seems designed to protect
the putative father's right to obtain custody; it does not, however,
address itself to the problem created when a putative father avoids
waiver of his rights by coming forward and acknowledging paternity
but neither asserts a right to custody nor consents to the adoption.
Although the father, in such a case, might seem to have deprived his
child of an expedient adoption, several solutions are possible: (1) The
court might determine that the putative father had abandoned the
child and his consent was, therefore, unnecessary;23 (2) the court
20. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text infra.
21. There are several excellent justifications for using the show cause device: (I)
It is in strict compliance with Stanley. (Stanley only requires notice of a hearing; it
does not require acknowledgement.) (2) "[T] he passive nature of the notice would
not tend to confuse the recipient... [nor] invite the participation of counsel." (3)
"[T] he show cause nature of the proceeding would avoid the problem of the under
eighteen year old mother, i.e., a subsequent statutory rape charge, and would also
avoid any admissions which might later be used in claims for seduction, adultery, in-
cest, fornication, or criminal nonsupport." (4) "[T] he notice . . . would not be a
bar to [paternity] suits which might later be filed by or on behalf of the mother or
infant child." (5) There is no waiver of rights [except to consent to the adoption
should the parent fail to appear]. "[T] he recipient is receiving only notice of a
hearing, and he need not take any action if he so desires." (6) "[T] he proceeding is
subject to the approval of the court, and if the adoption for any reason is not com-
pleted, the rights of all parties would remain intact." (7) "If the putative father does
not appear at the hearing, then presumably his rights would be extinguished." If he
does appear at the hearing, -'he will retain the burden of proving his paternity." D.
HOROWITZ & T. WILLHITE, WASH. AT'Y GEN. INFORMAL REPORT, PUTATIVE FATHERS
AND STANLEY V. ILLINOIS-DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES POLICY 12
(Oct. 4, 1972).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.010(4) (1963); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.030
(5) (1963). See also In re Reinius, 55 Wn. 2d 117, 124, 346 P.2d 672, 675 (1959)
(adoption agency stands in loco parentis and takes the place of the natural parents
in regard to consent to an adoption, in order to safeguard the best interests of the
child).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040(4) (1963). See notes 90-100 and accompany-
ing text infra. See also In re Lybbert, 75 Wn. 2d 671, 453 P.2d 650 (1969) (father
not attempting to gain custody is in a position "considerably subordinate" to that of
653
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might sever the father's interests in the child in a deprivation action;2 4
(3) the mother (or prosecuting attorney) could bring a filiation action
against the putative father and secure a judgment depriving him of
any right or obligation in his child and thus render his consent unnec-
essary.2 5
Another problem is whether a putative father who judicially has
been found to be the natural father and who has consented to his
child's adoption can withdraw his consent prior to the court's issuance
of an order for the child's relinquishment to an adoption agency or
individual. Since the mother of an illegitimate child retains the right to
withdraw her consent,26 under the equal protection reasoning of
Stanley a putative father necessarily would retain a similar right.2 7
Once the child is placed with an adoption agency pursuant to the
court's approval of the father's relinquishment, however, the con-
senting putative father, just as a consenting natural mother, loses all
rights to the child. "8
Although the consent requirements of the new statute do not distin-
guish between unwed fathers and unwed mothers, the statute treats
unwed parents differently than married parents in that they are denied
certain technical procedural safeguards which benefit married parents.
Before being deprived of rights in his child, a married parent must be
found in a separate hearing to have abandoned the child, to be incar-
cerated under circumstances indicating that the best interests of the
child require elimination of the necessity of consent,2 9 to be mentally
incompetent for one year or have been deprived judicially of all rights
a parent attempting to gain custody of his children in the context of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.32.040(4) (1963)).
24. Deprivation actions arise in the context of parental neglect or abuse and involve
removing the child for its own protection from the custody of its parents. Jurisdiction
to permanently deprive a parent of all rights in his or her child arises under the Juve-
nile Court Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(2)-(3) (Supp. 1972). See In re
Russell, 70 Wn. 2d 451, 423 P.2d 640 (1967); In re Sickles, 42 Wn. 2d 17, 252 P.2d
1063 (1953); In re Hudson, 13 Wn. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
25. Because of the length of time necessary to procure a filiation judgment,
this method is the least desirable from the standpoint of the welfare of the child. See
text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
26. State ex rel. Towne v. Superior Court, 24 Wn. 2d 441, 165 P.2d 862 (1946).
See note 28 infra.
27. See note 3 supra.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.070(1) (1963). Note that this section of the
Adoption Act was enacted subsequent to the Towne case which stated that the mother
of an illegitimate child could revoke her consent any time prior to entry of the inter-
locutory decree. See note 26 supra.
29. Cf. In re Sego, 82 Wn. 2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973).
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and obligations to the child. An unwed parent, however, need only fail
to appear at the show cause hearing.30
Despite these differences in procedure, the substantive rights of
married and unmarried parents are essentially the same. If a married
parent fails to appear at a hearing where the necessity of his consent is
adjudicated, his rights will be extinguished in much the same manner
as those of an unmarried parent who fails to appear at a show cause
hearing. The show cause hearing as a method of eliminating the rights
of a natural parent does not create any special problems because the
Supreme Court in Stanley implied that constitutional protections af-
forded to putative fathers were subject to the limitations of a "pow-
erful countervailing interest."3 ' Since it is questionable whether any
one of the four exceptions to the consent requirement would be found
applicable in every situation, the show cause device becomes a neces-
sary and valuable method of quickly and fairly eliminating uninter-
ested putative fathers. Clearly the "powerful countervailing interest" of
both the state and the adoptive child in facilitating valid and expedi-
tious adoptions require such a procedure. 32
30. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. The Judiciary Committee has
proposed that the word "illegitimate" be stricken from Subsection (5), rendering its
provisions equally applicable to married and unmarried parents. WASHINGTON STATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, suggested draft for amending ch. 134, § 1(4), [1973] Wash.
Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.3 2.040(4) (1963).
31. 'The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection." 405 U.S. at 645.
32. Practical difficulties weigh heavily against the putative father's consent being
treated with the same deference as a married parent's: (1) It would be difficult to
demonstrate that a putative father need not consent to his child's adoption pursuant to
one of the previously existing WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.040 (1963) consent ex-
ceptions. Although the abandonment exception would be useful in many instances,
see notes 90-100 and accompanying text infra, a natural parent, unlike a married
parent, cannot always be presumed cognizant of his child's existence and consequently
cannot be found to have abandoned a child of whose existence he may never have
been aware. (2) Proving affirmatively that a putative father was not entitled to con-
sent because of one of the previous statutory exceptions would entail costlier and more
time-consuming procedures than simply giving such a father an opportunity to assert
his rights in a show cause hearing. (3) The show cause device is more practical
from the standpoint of the putative father. See note 21 supra.
Besides practical problems, the interests of the child in an expedient adoption
weigh heavily against treating a putative father in the same manner as a married par-
ent. Prompt placement in an adoptive home serves the child's needs for early parental
attachment and minimizes the necessity for interim foster home care. Harmful psycho-
logical effects arising from repeated and sudden changes in the environment are re-
duced. Since extensive delay resulting from attempts to locate and secure the consent
of a putative father may cause the adoption to be postponed until the child is no
longer attractive to adoptive parents and result in his relegation to a foster home or in-
655
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IV. RELINQUISHMENT TO AGENCIES
The Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act adds specific
provisions for relinquishing illegitimate children to adoption agencies.
When only one parent seeks to surrender the child to an adoption
agency, a show cause hearing and notice are required in the same
manner as when the court seeks to eliminate the need for the putative
father's right to consent to his child's adoption. 33 The surrendering
parent must relinquish the child in writing and the petition for sur-
render will not be granted until the other parent also has relinquished
or the show cause procedure has been observed. If a putative father or
an unwed mother served with adequate notice fails to appear at the
show cause hearing, the court will deem the nonappearing parent to
have validly surrendered the child. 34 A putative father appearing at a
show cause hearing to determine whether the relinquishment should
be granted will be required to demonstrate paternity in the same
manner as a putative father who appears in a show cause hearing to
determine the necessity of his consent to his child's adoption. 35 Once
the court determines there has been a valid surrender, the rights of the
illegitimate child's natural parents cease and the agency may place the
child for adoption without notice to or consent of either parent. 36
V. NOTICE
The Court in Stanley noted in passing that "extending opportunity
for hearing to unwed fathers who desire and claim competence to care
for their children creates no constitutional or procedural obstacle to
foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so inclined." 37 Unfortu-
stitutional care, a fair but speedy method of eliminating the necessity of the putative
father's consent is unquestionably more compatible with the child's best interests
than prolonged and uncertain litigation involving the requirement of consent. See
Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Un-
known Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 523-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley].
33. Ch. 134, § 8(1), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.015 (Supp.
1973).
34. Ch. 134 § 7(4), [1973] Wash. Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.010
(1963).
35. Ch. 134, § 8(3)(a)-(b), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.015
(3)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973).
36. Ch. 134, § 7(5), [1973] Wash. Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.010
(1963).
37. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
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nately, the Court was indulging in gross oversimplification. Extending
notice to unwed fathers calls for complex and sensitive procedural
mechanisms; applying these mechanisms while remaining in contact
with the realities of extramarital childbirth is a difficult and delicate
task.
Putative fathers now must receive notice of the show cause hearing
at which the necessity of their consent will be determined. 38 The no-
tice, addressed to the natural parent and "to all whom it may con-
cern" must state the purpose, time and place" of the hearing and con-
tain the name of the mother and of the child.39 When a named puta-
tive father cannot be located, notice must be sent to his last known
address. 40
Publication will be required unless a putative father acknowledges
paternity4' in writing and the court enters a separate finding that he is
38. Ch. 134, § 6(1), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(1)
(Supp. 1973). The Section requires service of summons ten days prior to the
hearing.
It has been suggested that attorneys do not schedule hearings to determine whether
the putative father's consent is necessary at the same time as the hearing on the pe-
tition for adoption unless absolutely certain that the putative father will not appear
and demand custody in the presence of the adoptive parents. Honeywell, Adoptions:
Illegitimate Children and Stanley v. Illinois, 27 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 23, 25 (May
1973) [hereinafter cited as Honeywell].
39. Ch. 134, § 6(3), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(3)
(Supp. 1973).
40. Ch. 134, § 6(l)(a), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(I)(a)
(Supp. 1973).
41. Is some type of formal acknowledgement necessary before a putative father is
entitled to the right to notice of his child's adoption? The theory that acknowledge-
ment is necessary derives from the fact that Peter Stanley openly admitted paternity
and functioned responsibly as the father of his children. Brief for the Petitioner at 18,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Although an Illinois putative father's formal
acknowledgement of paternity at a preliminary filiation hearing or at a subsequent
trial may be treated by the trier of fact as conclusive of paternity in a filiation pro-
ceeding (ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 1063,4, § 59 (Supp. 1972-73)), written or oral ac-
knowledgement confers no inheritance status on an illegitimate child in Illinois un-
less the parents intermarry. Krupp v. Sackwitz, 30 I11. App. 2d 450, 174 N.E.2d 877
(1961). It thus can be concluded that Stanley's oral acknowledgements in informal
settings prior to the death of his common law wife carried no legal connotation
other than as some evidence that he considered himself the father of the children.
Since the acknowledgement in Stanley was only evidentiary, it is questionable whether
the case should be interpreted as requiring a formal acknowledgement before rights to
notice and an opportunity to be heard are extended.
In Washington, by acknowledging paternity in writing the father of an illegitimate
child presumably will be legitimizing the child for purposes of intestate succession.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.081 (Supp. 1972). If after acknowledgement the child
were adopted by a third party, WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.085 1963) would protect a
putative father's legitimate children from the illegitimate child's competing claim of
intestate succession.
Acknowledgement has another adverse effect on the father's interests-exposing a
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indeed the parent, or the court finds him to be the natural father in a
filiation proceeding. 42 Even where the putative father has acknowl-
edged paternity or has been found to be the child's father in a filiation
proceeding, the court has additional discretion to order publication
"whenever the court believes such notice might be necessary to pro-
tect the validity of adoption proceedings and decree of adoption. 43
This provision anticipates instances when publication is required de-
spite acknowledgement or entry of a paternity judgment in order to
protect adoptive parents from attempts of inadequately notified puta-
tive fathers not parties to the proceedings, 44 to vacate adoptions.45
putative father to a paternity action by a mother who later decides not to relinquish
the child for adoption or to withdraw a previous relinquishment before the court has
acted on it. (See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.) A putative father has
no protection through contract since in most jurisdictions, including Washington, a
mother cannot contract away her child's right to support. See, e.g., Griggs v. Morgan,
4 Wn. App. 468, 481 P.2d 913 (1971). Since a mother retains the right to withdraw
her consent prior to acceptance of the relinquishment, a putative father who ac-
knowledges paternity to prevent the embarrassment of publication has no protection
against a mother who later decides to keep her child and sue for filiation and support.
42. Ch. 134, § 6(2)(a)-(b), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32
.085(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973). One commentator has recommended the following:
In a situation in which the adoptive parents know all the names and circum-
stances surrounding the adoption, a finding of paternity may be entered in the
findings of fact at the time of the hearing on the petition. However, if the adoptive
parents know nothing of the natural parents, it is suggested that a separate find-
ing of paternity be entered in advance of the hearing on the petition for adoption.
While the new legislation makes no reference to the minimum requisites for a
finding of paternity . .. the notarized consent of the father containing an
acknowledgement of paternity should be sufficient to support such a finding.
Honeywell, supra note 38, at 25.
43. Ch. 134, § 6(2), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(2)
(Supp. 1973).
44. Where one putative father has been found to be the child's father, this finding
could not be considered res judicata or collaterally estop another putative father who
was never served with adequate notice and thus was not a party to the action. See
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (1942).
45. See note 58 infra. A putative father signing an acknowledgement of paternity
could be one of many putative fathers. Even an uncontested paternity judgment is
subject to doubt as to validity. Additional protection could be imposed by requiring
a putative father acknowledging paternity to submit to a blood test. If the putative
father's blood type was inconsistent with paternity of the child, publication could
still be required or perhaps the mother would be induced to name the real father.
Of course, while a blood test can disprove paternity, it cannot be relied upon to es-
tablish paternity conclusively. (In filiation proceedings, the great majority of courts
will not admit evidence of blood tests to support a charge of paternity. C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 522 (2d ed. 1972)) Consequently, where the mother has had sexual re-
lations with more than one man, the possibility of at least one putative father not re-
ceiving adequate notice will always remain.
The possibility that more than one putative father exists is not at all farfetched.
See, e.g., S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 167 (4th ed. 1967) where
the author cites a blood test study in New York City which found that approximately
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When the court has reason to believe that another putative father will-
not receive adequate notice, publication is the only effective way of
eliminating the possibility of such a potential father's returning subse-
quent to his child's placement in an adoptive home and demanding
custody.46 As the Court in Stanley noted, "Unwed fathers who do not
promptly respond cannot complain. . ... "-4
The Act effectively deals with complications which result when a
named putative father cannot be located. In addition to notice mailed
to his last known address, the Act calls for publication when "after
diligent search" the father cannot be found within the state.48 Unfor-
30% of those men who deny paternity and demand a blood test are not the fathers.
Another study revealed that there was' a high degree of perjury in paternity cases.
In Chicago, 40% of female petitioners confessed to polygraphists that they had had
sexual intercourse with other men besides the accused during the conception period.
In Orange County, California, over one-third of female petitioners in paternity suits
admitted intercourse with more than one man during the conception period. Id. at 484
(Supp. 1970).
46. See note 58 infra.
47. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9. The Act does not specify in which county publication is
to take place. The possibilities include the county where the mother resides, the
county where the putative father was last known to reside, the county where the
adoptive parents reside, the county where the child is born, the county where the child
is relinquished or the county where the child is conceived. The Judiciary Committee
has drafted statutory language which will require:
That the court shall inquire as to the belief that any person so sought might be
found either in one or more counties within the state, and if such possibility
exists, the court shall see that publication of notice under this subsection shall
be made by the clerk of the court in each such county.
WASHINGTON STATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, suggested draft for amending ch. 134,
§ 8(2)(b), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.015(2)(b) (Supp. 1973).
48. Ch. 134, § 6(l), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(1)
(Supp. 1973). The question arises whether publication will be sufficient to protect
the interests of an unknown out-of-state putative father. In Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965), an adoption decree was rendered invalid because publication
to an out-of-state father with a known address was not adequate notice and thus a
denial of due process. Since there has been no case dealing with an unknown out-
of-state father (or a known out-of-state father with no known address), dictum from
Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) would seem appli-
cable, see text accompanying note 69 infra.
However, a putative father might attack a decree of adoption on the basis that
depriving a nonresident parent of custody is impermissible and the decree is void for
want of jurisdiction. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-44 (1953), where
the Court held that a decree depriving a nonresident parent of custody is not entitled
to full faith and credit in the absence of the issuing court's personal jurisdiction over
such parent. However, May dealt with a conflicts of law problem-
full faith and credit, not jurisdiction under the due process clause . . .. and ...
there is some ground for the view that adoption decrees are not entitled to full
faith and credit in any case. Secondly and more importantly-there appear to be
some basic distinctions between custody and adoption.
All that is ordinarily necessary for an award of custody . . . is proof that the
welfare of the child will be better served by such an arrangement . . . custody
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tunately, the scope of the "diligent search" required is unknown, but
presumably will have to be decided according to the unique circum-
stances of each case. It is apparent, however, that time and treasure
expended on potentially futile searches for missing fathers are subject
to the limitations of practicality and the best interests of the child.49
VI. MOTHERS' RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
DETERRENT EFFECT
Since an unwed mother cannot be required to name her child's fa-
ther,50 the framers of the Bill faced an unfortunate dilemma. All po-
tential fathers are entitled to notice; it must be assumed that there may
be more than one putative father, and he (they) have no knowledge of
the relinquishment of the child to an agency or its placement with
adoptive parents. If the father is not named and the mother's name
does not appear in the published notice, the father cannot identify the
child as his own. Consequently, the publication requirements are
strict. The published notice must state the name of the father (if
known), the name of the mother, the child's name and the purpose,
time and place of the hearing.5 1
Unfortunately, publishing a mother's name in a local newspaper in
a manner which indicates she has given birth to an illegitimate child
may be embarrassing to her and a source of disgrace in her commu-
nity. Fear of such publication may even influence a mother to keep
decrees are usually modifiable upon proof of changed circumstances; and it
has been suggested that the real rationale of May v. Anderson was the refusal to
countenance Ohio's denial of modification of a prior sister-state custody decree.
On the other hand, an adoption decree is final.
Baade, Interstate and Foreign Adoptions in North Carolina, 40 N.C. L. REV. 691,
703-04 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
49. For discussion, see note 32 supra, second paragraph.
50. But see note 68 infra.
51. Ch. 134, § 6(3), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(3)
(Supp. 1973) (sample notice form). Publishing notice "to whom it may concern"
as well as any named putative fathers eliminates the possibility that the unnamed true
father will later challenge the adoption. See Note, 61 ILL. B.J. 380 (Mar. 1973).
The Judiciary Committee has proposed that the mother's or father's (when he has
relinquished and the whereabouts of the mother are unknown) name be left off the
published notice. In place of the parent's name will be the date of the child's birth, the
name of the hospital and the city and county of the child's birth. WASHINGTON STATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, suggested draft for amending ch. 134, § 6(3), [1973] Wash.
Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.085(3) (Supp. 1973). This type of notice raises
obvious constitutionality questions.
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the child when its best interests would be furthered by adoption.5 2 In
small communities, where published notice would be more conspicu-
ous, the rate of relinquishments might show a significant decline '5 3 and
produce as an undesirable byproduct an increase in private and black
market adoptions. 54
The publication requirement may have another consequence. In
many instances mothers of illegitimate children will leave the state to
escape unwanted publicity. The mother's "escape" will often be suc-
cessful, and she will procure an adoption for her illegitimate child in a
state where notice requirements are still nonexistent.55 An "escape"
adoption, however, can be vacated by a putative father who ascertains
the state where the adoptive parents reside.56 Since the Act's publica-
52. The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1973, at I, col. 1. The executive director of
California's largest private adoption agency has stated that several mothers have kept
their children rather than name the fathers. Id.
53. The new complications have hit the adoption field at a time when it appeared
that the number of children under state care and in foster homes might at last
be sharply reduced. Liberalized abortion laws, increased use of birth control
methods and a growing trend among unwed mothers to keep their children have
produced a dramatic drop in the number of babies available for adoption. Mean-
while, an increasing number of couples are willing to adopt.
Id. See also D. HOROWITZ & T. WILLHITE, WASH. ATr'Y GEN. INFORMAL REPORT,
PUTATIvE FATHERS AND STANLEY V. ILLINOIS--DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES
POLICY 10 (Oct. 4, 1972).
54. The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1. See also The "Strange
Boundaries" of Stanley, supra note 32, at 526-27. Private placements are often
criticized because they may lead to the child's being placed but not legally adopted,
they fail to provide needed follow-up services to the adoptive parents, there is no
guarantee that the child has been placed in a suitable home and they encourage the
sale of babies for profit in the black market. With the increase in demand for adopt-
able children, there are signs that the black market adoptions are increasing and the
publication requirement may become a factor in maintaining a dangerously high
rate of baby sales, consequently perpetuating black market placements.
Black market adoptions which place children without normal procedures can cost
adoptive parents anywhere from $3,000 to $21,000. Counsel for several Chicago
adoption agencies stated: "The Supreme Court's decisions are a blessing to these doc-
tors and lawyers who don't ask embarrassing questions." The Wall Street Journal, July
9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
WASH. REy. CODE § 26.36.010 (1963) strictly prohibits the black marketing of
children:
It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, society, association, or corpora-
tion, except the parents, to assume the permanent care, custody or control of
any minor child unless authorized to do so by a written order of the
superior court of the state.
55. Many states have not adopted the notice provisions of Stanley. Officials say
they are waiting for new statutes or judicial decisions to clarify the implications of
the decision. The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
56. The factual situation in Rothstein involved a mother who relinquished her
child in a different state from that in which the child was conceived. See note 4
supra and note 64 infra.
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tion requirements simply embody a putative father's constitutional
right to notice, 57 failure to comply with them nullifies a state's juris-
diction over the child; attempts to change the child's status are there-
fore void ab initio.58
Some "escape" adoptions may be inevitable. An out of state adop-
tion is so unlikely to be vacated by an attacking putative father that a
natural mother may not be deterred by such an attenuated possibility.
Ironically, use of publication to satisfy the notice requirement may
encourage natural mothers to cross state lines, putting in jeopardy the
very goal-giving a putative father notice and an opportunity to as-
sert his right to custody-that the Act so rigorously had sought to pro-
tect. Where "escape" relinquishments are successful, the putative fa-
ther will not receive notice; where ineffective and the putative father is
later able to ascertain the residence of his child, extended litigation
may result in further disruption of the child's life.59
Although the publication requirement may produce unwanted con-
sequences, there is no other reasonable alternative, given the require-
ment of notice. It has been suggested that a "subsisting relationship"
between the parent and the child should be a prerequisite to the right
to notice(50 This assertion would limit Stanley to its facts" and as-
sumes that most putative fathers will not have established a subsisting
relationship with the child, rendering publication unnecessary. Under
this theory, it is only those few identifiable putative fathers who have
57. See note 3 supra.
58. Proper notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Failure to extend expressly re-
quired notice renders an adoption void ab initio. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965); In re Hope, 30 Wn. 2d 185, 191 P.2d 289 (1948); State ex rel. Le
Brook v. Wheeler, 43 Wash. 183, 86 P. 394 (1906).
The question arises as to how a void ab initio decree of adoption rendered by a
court with improper jurisdiction can be shielded from attack by a putative father
who can prove paternity. The answer lies in the policy recognized by the new statute
that at some point in time (see notes 77-87 and accompanying text infra), the
interests of the child in "situation stability" must prevail over the interests of the pu-
tative father. The decree, although void ab initio, will be shielded from attack in order
to protect the best interests of the child.
59. See note 32 supra. The possibility of detrimental effects on the personality
development of the child should weigh heavily. "Psychologists caution against sever-
ing a child from his father and mother images, once formed or re-formed, and the
courts today accept by judicial notice that this is detrimental to the child." Comment,
Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 232,
233 (footnotes omitted).
60. See Wolverton, Whom does new adoption law protect?, The Seattle Times,
June 19, 1973, atC4, col. 5.
61. Peter Stanley had lived with his wife and children for many years prior to her
death. See note 3 supra.
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demonstrated parental responsibility that are entitled to notice and an
opportunity to demand custody.62
This theory fails, however, when subjected to close analysis. First,
"[t] o make entitlement to constitutional rights depend upon the
strength of social ties is to necessitate either difficult case-by-case fac-
tual determinations or the drawing of wholly arbitrary lines."'63 Sec-
ond, subsequent United States Supreme Court per curiam and state
supreme court decisions have disregarded the absence of a subsisting
relationship. 64 Third, such a requirement would ignore the central
question in adoption proceedings--"a father's interest in the future
companionship and enjoyment of his children. ' 65 This interest is inde-
pendent of how the child is conceived and separable from the father's
apparent previous lack of concern for the child. 66 The only effective
method of protecting both the interests of the child and the interests of
the putative father is to base the father's right to notice on his biolog-
ical relationship with the child. Any other basis invites arbitrary cate-
gorization and constitutionally questionable presumptions.67
By requiring notice in all cases, Washington has accepted the biol-
ogical relationship rather than the subsisting relationship as the basis
62. "Subsisting relationship" could be defined as "providing reasonable support"
(Letter from the Honorable Carl L. Loy, Judge of the Superior Court of the State
of Washington for the County of Yakima to Orris L. Hamilton, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Washington, June 14, 1972, on file with the Washington State
Judicial Council, University of Washington School of Law, No. 72-3-11) or "[having]
had no continuing parental relationship with the child for a period of niore than'one
year .. " (House Bill No. 755, § 2(d)(1973)).
63. The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley, supra note 32, at 522.
64. In Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan
(see note 4 supra), the parents had lived with each other for approximately three
months, during which time the child was conceived. Months later, long after the
parents had separated, the child was born. When the father learned of the existence
of the child and the mother's relinquishment to adoptive parents, he petitioned for
custody seeking to vacate the decree of adoption. The putative father did not at any
time have custody of his child and did not at any time maintain a relationship with
the child that might be considered "subsisting." Brief of the Appellant at 6 & Appen-
dix B-l, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972). In Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 I11. 2d
20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972), the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court did not men-
tion the concept of a subsisting relationship and it would appear that the father had
never lived with mother or child.
65. The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley, supra note 32, at 522 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. The Court in Stanley cautioned against the dangers of presuming 'nwed fa-
thers to be unfit parents:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized deter-
mination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to
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for establishing a putative father's right to notice. Because the biolog-
ical relationship often leads to uncertainty when a putative father
cannot be located or is unnamed,6 8 notice by publication is unavoid-
able. Under existing requirements of due process "resort to publica-
tion . . . in the case of persons missing or unknown, [although] indi-
rect, and even . . .probably futile . . .is all that the situation per-
mits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing
their rights. ' ' 6 Publication, although fraught with difficulties, is still
the best possible notice.
Assuming, however, that a natural mother has an "expectation of
privacy, '70 and that "the web of norms and values"7 ' of society make
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important in-
terests of both parent and child.
405 U.S. at 656-57.
Michigan has attempted to circumvent the publication problem by use of a paternal
registration scheme. If a putative father has sustained the burden of registering
prior to the birth of his child, he will be entitled to notice of its adoption. Unfor-
tunately, the statute, while providing a solution to the practical problems of giving
notice, ignores problems caused by interstate adoptions, "burdens the unwed father
with a confusing and inconvenient registration system" and presupposes that the child
is or should be aware of his child's impending birth. The "Strange Boundaries" of Stan-
ley, supra note 32, at 527-28.
In Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), the Court offered some indication that
merely a biological relationship establishes a putative father's right to notice of pro-
ceedings which may permanently deprive him of custody of his illegitimate child. The
Court held that a Texas law that denied illegitimate children the right to seek support
from putative fathers, while permitting the same rights to children of married par-
ents, was a denial of equal protection. By recognizing the obligation of a "biological
father" to support his illegitimate child, the Court by necessary inference may also
have recognized the converse right of a "biological father" to notice of those pro-
ceedings which may permanently deprive him custody of his illegitimate child.
68. It is an open question whether a state could require a natural mother to iden-
tify a putative father. See Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), ap-
peal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (denial of equal protection for a state to require
the mother of an illegitimate child registering for AFDC to divulge the name of
the child's father). But see Doe v. Norton, 2 Pov. L. REP. 17.591 (D. Conn. 1973)
(statute requiring all unwed mothers to name the father of their child or be subject
to imprisonment for civil contempt does not deny equal protection because it af-
fects both AFDC and non-AFDC mothers equally).
69. Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
70. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring):
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
By requiring the mother of an illegitimate child to either name the child's father
or fill in "none named" in the appropriate blank, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.58.080 (1963)
makes a child's illegitimacy a matter of public record. Does the state requirement
prevent the mother's expectation of privacy from being reasonable?
71. Comment, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 154, 179 (1972).
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such an expectation reasonable, the issue of whether publication in-
vades her right to privacy must be resolved. The right to privacy may
be waived by naming the putative father or relinquishing the child for
adoption.72 If not, as with most issues of constitutional dimension, a
balancing of interests is necessary.73 Against the mother's interests
must be weighed the interests of the putative father as defined by Stan-
ley,74 the potential interests of the child in being in the care and cus-
tody of its natural father75 and the interests of the state in providing
secure and unassailable adoptions. Although these interests are impor-
tant, a natural mother's right to privacy may be more worthy of pro-
tection. Decisions to date, however, do not adequately support the
concept of a natural mother's right to privacy, nor are policy consider-
ations underlying right to privacy decisions relevant to parents of ille-
gitimates. 76
72. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).'If a mother can waive her right
to privacy, questions as to what would constitute such a waiver arise. By naming a
putative father who cannot be found, has she consented to publication of notice "to
whom it may concern" so that all rights of all putative fathers are eliminated? By
attempting to relinquish the child for adoption to a public or private agency, has she
voluntarily consented to whatever method of notice is necessary to eliminate a puta-
tive father's rights? If certain specific acts of a natural mother do constitute a waiver
of her right to privacy, are Miranda type warnings necessary before her waiver is
valid? See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
73. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). In Roe, the Court stated
that only "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty' are included in [the] guarantee of personal privacy." Id.
at 152. To date, at least one court has found that a natural mother's right "to keep
secret the name of her child's father was not so 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty' as to require constitutional protection." Doe v. Norton, 2
Pov. L. REP. 17,591 (D. Conn. 1973).
74. See note 3 supra.
75. See note 145 infra.
76. At the heart of the Court's recent privacy decisions is the policy that-
where privacy encourages family stability or other socially desir'ablb goals, it should
not be invaded absent a convincing state need. See generally Brodie, Privacy: The
Family and the State, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 743. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, privacy-
reinforced the integrity of the family (381 U.S. at 485), and in Eisenstadt, privacy
encouraged individual freedom of procreation (405 U.S. at 453). Neither consider-
ation is pertinent to the natural mother's rights being violated by publication. But see
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The Court in Wyman held that an AFDC
mother could not on privacy grounds refuse to allow a caseworker into her home.
The Court stated that such an intrusion was not an unreasonable search, forbidden
by the fourth amendment:
The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent. There
is no more worthy object of the public's concern. The dependent child's needs
are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs . . . to a
position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights.
400 U.S. at 318. As with Wyman, the question of whether the requirement of pub-
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VI. PRIMARY RIGHTS AND POST ADOPTION
PROCEDURES
Section 9 of the Act contains two separate concepts: the recognition
of a general primary right of natural parents to custody and the limi-
tation of that right when adoptive parents have had custody for one
year. The juxtaposition of these concepts has already created confu-
sion. Both appear in a single paragraph, which is not separated into
subsections. Therefore, the entire paragraph might be misread as indi-
cating that the natural parent has a primary right to custody of his or
her child which continues indefinitely after the child's adoption and is
always a factor in deciding custody disputes between natural and
adoptive parents. This clearly was not the legislative intent.
Rather, the first part of Section 9 is intended to provide new gen-
eral guidelines for determining custody of illegitimate children. It
states the general policy that a natural parent now retains the primary
right to the custody of the child. 77 The first part of the Section 9 also
states that "between the [natural] parents of an illegitimate child,"
the parent who can better further the interests of the child will have a
"superior right to custody. '78
The second part of Section 9, a last minute addition, 79 specifically
limits the primary right of natural parents who have received inade-
quate notice of adoption to a period of one year after the child has
been placed with adoptive parents. Its essential provisions are that
inadequately notified natural parents who attack the validity of an
adoption will forfeit their primary right if (1) the adoptive parents
have had actual custody of the child for at least one year; (2) they
have custody pursuant to a court order or placement by a state or pri-
vate agency; and (3) the adoptive parents have initiated adoption pro-
ceedings. 80 If the above provisions are satisfied the court will place the
lication violates the mother's right to privacy must be answered with an eye to
the best interests of the child.
77. Ch. 134, § 9, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110 (Supp.
1973).
78. Id.
79. Introduced by Representative Eikenberry, the amendment was supposed to
offer "firm language for the courts to use in judging those difficult human cases when
a natural parent seeks to take custody of a child from an adoptive home." Seattle
Times, Mar. 1, 1973, at AI2, col. 1-3.
80. Although the requirements are numbered "(1)" and "(2)," a careful reading
of the Section reveals that there are actually three requirements. Ch. 134, § 9, [ 1973]
Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110 (Supp. 1973).
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child with the person who is best fit to advance his welfare, weighing
heavily the child's need for "situation stability."8'
The putative father who receives inadequate notice is not barred
from attacking the adoption after the adoptive parents have had cus-
tody for one year, but having forfeited his primary right, he will find it
extremely difficult to successfully vacate the decree and secure cus-
tody. He or she will have to demonstrate: (1) That he or she received
improper notice;82 (2) he or she is indeed the biological parent;83 and
(3) the child's best interests, weighing heavily the factor of situation
stability, require that it be removed from the adoptive parents' home.84
Demonstrating the third element will require showing: (1) The nat-
ural parent is a fit parent for custody; (2) the adoptive parent is less
suitable as a parent; and (3) removing the child from the adoptive
parents' home will not be detrimental to his welfare.
Although natural parents who promptly assert their rights by ap-
pearing at a show cause hearing or who, in the event of improper no-
tice, attack the adoption decree before the adoptive parents have had
custody for one year will maintain their primary right, those who do
not receive notice and consequently do not attack the decree until
after the adoptive parents have had custody for one year probably will
not gain custody of their child. A natural parent who does receive
proper notice but fails to appear at the-show cause hearing to deter-
mine the necessity of his consent, forfeits his primary right immedi-
ately,85 as do parents who have been permanently deprived of custo-
dy86 or found to have abandoned their child.87
The following hypothetical illustrates how the Section may operate:
C is an illegitimate child six months old living with his mother, M. C's
natural father, F, lives in the same city, is aware of C's existence but
does not visit or support C or M. M is killed in an automobile accident.
81. Id.
82. If there was proper notice, by publication or otherwise, judgment at the
show cause hearing will extinguish the rights of the natural parents. See notes 19-22
and 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
•83. If a putative father appears at a show cause hearing held to determine whether
his consent is necessary for adoption or relinquishment to an agency, the Act requires
a finding of paternity. Ch. 134, § 6(2)(a)-(b), [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE
§26.32.085 (2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973).
84. Ch. 134, § 9, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110
(Supp. 1973).
85. See notes 19-22 and 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 126-130 and accompanying text infra.
87. See notes 90-100 and accompanying text infra.
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G, the grandmother of C and mother of M, takes care of the child but
neglects to petition for guardanship or adoption. One year later, after
talking to the family attorney A, G decides to petition for the adoption
of C. A purposefully fails to notify F fearing that F might be unco-
operative. Instead, A publishes notice in the Beacon Hill News88 and
stipulates that the putative father is unknown. An interlocutory decree
of adoption is granted. Fourteen months later, F, having married and
settled down, decides he would like custody of his child and approaches
G. After finding that G has adopted C, F brings suit in superior court
seeking to vacate the adoption; vacation is denied. F, although success-
ful in demonstrating that he received less than the best possible notice
contemplated by the statute and successful in proving paternity, nev-
ertheless lost his primary right to custody because the adoptive parent,
G, had custody pursuant to a decree of adoption for a period of one
year.
Changing the facts somewhat can illustrate problems which the
framers of Section 9 probably never contemplated. If 1 1 months after
G had secured an interlocutory decree F sought to vacate the decree,
he probably would be successful. G would not have had custody for a
one year period pursuant to a court order, and hence F would still
maintain primary right to his child even though the child had been in
the grandmother's custody for one year and 11 months. (Note that
G had custody of C for one year prior to petitioning for adoption.) By
negative implication the statute subordinates the welfare of the child to
the primary right of the natural parent as long as the natural parent
attacks within one year after the court order.
This inflexible one year rule obviously can work a great deal of
mischief in the context of adoption."!' It is questionable whether such
a delicate area as parental rights should be subject to such rigid guide-
lines. Although a putative father's right to custody should be protected
88. King County has managed to subtract substance from what is already ephem-
eral. Constructive notice to unwed fathers and other interested parties prior to a
permanent dependency or deprivation hearing is published in what are unquestionably
not generally circulated newspapers in the Seattle area, e.g., The Beacon Hill News.
As lax as this publication standard seems, it satisfies notice requirements of WASH.
REV. CODE § 12.04.080 (1963). Whether it satisfies constitutional requirements of
due process is an entirely different question. See Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306(1950).
89. The one year limitation on primary rights does conform with WASH. R. Civ. P.
60(b), allowing certain judgments, including those involving minors, to be set aside
within one year for specified legal and equitable deficiencies.
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whenever possible, practical and equitable considerations militate
against strict compliance with statutory requirements in all circum-
stances. The situation begs for a solution which somehow preserves
needed judicial discretion.
An opportunity for flexibility might be found in a provision of the
adoption statute left unchanged by the 1973 amendments: No consent
for a child's adoption is required when a parent, after proper notice,
has been found by a court to have deserted br abandoned the child
"under circumstances showing a willful substantial lack of regard for
parental obligations."' 0 This abandonment subsection has been inter-
preted liberally in Washington and has been used to separate parents
from their offspring where fairness and the welfare of the child de-
mand."' The rationale of abandonment is that a parent who is derelict
in his duty to support and protect the child forfeits his right to the
child's custody; :12 therefore, he cannot be heard to complain about
losing his right to take custody of his child since no right of his has
been adversely affected. A showing of objective intent to abandon is
not required; the intent may be inferred from the actions of the aban-
doning parent. :93 A showing of circumstances which would lead a rea-
sonable person to know of the child's existence, such as knowledge of
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040(4) (1963). For complete text of Sub-
section (4), see text accompanying note 18 supra.
91. In an early case, the Washington court stated that abandonment does not
necessarily mean that a parent has no interest in the child's welfare, but that the
parent had withdrawn from or neglected parental duties and withheld care and
protection, and sympathy and affection. In re Potter, 85 Wash. 617, 620, 149 P.
23, 24 (1915). More recent-cases have underscored the objective nature of abandon-
ment. See In re Lybbert, 75 Wn. 2d 671, 674, 453 P.2d 650, 653 (1969) ("parental
obligations . . . entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection
for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education, and general
well being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and
medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domocile; and (5) the duty to
furnish social and religious guidance."). See also In re Maypole, 4 Wn. App. 672,
483 P.2d 878 (1971) (under Lybbert definition of "parental obligations," a teenage
mother had abandoned her child "under circumstances showing a willful substantial
lack of regard for parental obligations" when she allowed her mother's neighbor to
take custody of the child and visited it only infrequently over a three year period).
92. [T] he "right" to custody stems from the obligation to support, educate,
and protect the child. These are reciprocal rights and obligations that are depen-
dent upon each other and do not exist separately. Traditionally, this reasoning
has been used when courts cut off the parental custody rights of abandoned chil-
dren. When a parent abandons his duty to support and protect the child, he
forfeits his right to the child's custody.
Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice, 1968
U. ILL. L.F. 232, 233.
93. In re Hancasty, 66Wn. 2d 680, 404 P.2d 762(1965).
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the pregnancy of the mother coupled with actions which indicate no
interest in the child, also might be the basis for inferring an intention to
abandon the child.
Furthermore, even if a putative father has received inadequate no-
tice of his child's adoption, was not aware of the existence of the
child, and the circumstances would not lead a reasonable man to gain
such awareness, abandonment proceedings still might be initiated as
soon as the putative father learned of the existence of the child and
gave evidence of his knowledge by attacking an existing decree of
adoption. However, in order to find abandonment under these cir-
cumstances, the courts will be required to interpret the words of the
abandonment statute, "under circumstances showing a willful . . .
lack of regard for parental obligations,""4 as including the circum-
stance of an absent and unnotified father who was unaware of the exist-
ence of his child at the time of the original relinquishment proceeding.
Factors which might be considered in inferring the required intent in-
clude the length of time the adoptive parents have had custody of the
child prior to the father's attempt to recover custody, the father's fit-
ness as a parent, the exact form of notice the father received (inade-
quate or nonexistent) and whether the father was dilatory in asserting
his rights to the child.
Such an interpretation of the abandonment statute may be permis-
sible under the reasoning of Stanley for two reasons: (1) Stanley in-
volved statutory presumptions and not case by case determinations.!'-
Putative fathers who are subjected to this ex post facto" type of aban-
donment proceeding are not presumed to have abandoned their child;
the question of abandonment depends upon the facts of each case; (2)
the best interests of the child in Stanley were furthered by giving cus-
tody to the natural parent." 7 When adoptive parents have had custody
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.040(4) (1963). For complete text of Subsection
(4), see text accompanying note 18 supra.
95. See notes 3 and 67 supra.
96. Abandonment is by necessity an ex post facto determination in the setting
of a putative father's attempt to vacate an existing decree of adoption. The question of
whether the child was abandoned must of necessity be litigated subsequent to the
actual abandonment. Providing notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
abandonment issue is no obstacle when a father appears to contest his child's adop-
tion. (As a practical matter, personal service on an abandoning parent at the time of
abandonment is a contradiction in terms. Baade, Interstate and Foreign Adoptions in
North Carolina, 40 N.C.L. REV. 691, 704 (1962)).
97. See note 145 infra.
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of the child for a significant period of time, the child's interests may
be furthered by remaining in their custody, and these interests may
outweigh the rights of the putative father. Although the original de-
cree of adoption which the putative father attacked might be void ab
initio"18 because of failure to extend proper notice, the finding of aban-
donment eliminates all the putative father's rights in the child in-
cluding his right to take custody, and a new decree may be rendered
in favor of the adoptive parents without disturbing their custody
of the child.
98. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
A recent Superior Court of Spokane County case, In re Baby Girl Lisa, Civil No.
95323 (Spokane County, 1973), which was initiated prior to the enactment of the
Illegitimate Children and Parental Rights Act, might indicate that the abandonment
exception to the consent requirement cannot be applied to a putative father who re-
ceives improper notice and returns subsequent to his child's adoption to seek custody.
In Baby Girl Lisa, the parents had lived together intermittently prior and subse-
quent to the birth of the child. When the father temporarily moved to Seattle, the
mother relinquished the child to Children's Home Society of Washington. The court
accepted the relinquishment without notice to the putative father. The child was
placed with foster parents. Several weeks later, Children's Home Society became cog-
nizant of the implications of Stanley and contacted the putative father in Seattle,
seeking his consent to the pending adoption and, if he refused to consent, notifying
him to appear at a hearing to show cause why he should not be found to have aban-
doned the child. The father immediately contacted Legal Services which moved to set
aside the order to show cause. The Legal Services motion was denied but because of
the extensive fact finding required, the show cause hearing was set on the trial cal-
endar. Prior to the date of trial, Legal Services moved for summary judgment to vacate
the order of relinquishment.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment Children's Home Society
argued that the putative father's consent initially was not required because WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.37.010(2) (1963) confers authority on a parent to surrender a child
for adoption when the other parent has abandoned the child. Children's Home So-
ciety argued that the express terms of the statute do not call for notice to the aban-
doning parent, therefore the mother's relinquishment was sufficient and the father had
no right to custody. Interview with Dan Wershow, former Attorney for Spokane Legal
Services, in Seattle, Jan. 10, 1973.
Summarized, Legal Services arguments were as follows: (1) WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.37.010(2) (1963) has been limited expressly by State ex rel. LeBrook v. Wheel-
er, 43 Wash. 183, 86 P. 394 (1906), which held that notice was required to establish
statutory jurisdiction under § 26.37.010(2) or the relinquishment was void ab
initio; (2) on its face, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.010(2) (1963) violates the requirements
of due process by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard pursuant
to the requirements of Stanley (see note 3 supra) and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965). Children's Home Society had gained custody of the child by con-
stitutionaIly defective procedures; therefore, the order of relinquishment was void
ab initio. In re Baby Girl Lisa, Respondent's Memorandum, Civil No. 95323 (Spokane
County, 1973).
The court granted the motion for summary judgment and awarded custody to the
putative father. Although Baby Girl Lisa might be cited as authority that a court
cannot find a putative father to have abandoned his child in an ex post facto pro-
ceeding, a careful examination of the facts will indicate otherwise. First, the abandon-
ment issue was never tried; the only issue decided was whether the order of relinquish-
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Because of the practical difficulties which agencies and profes-
sionals will encounter in locating putative fathers, : ' : the courts must be
prepared to find an extra legal foothold to avoid the vacation of an
adoption to the detriment of the best interests of the child; the aban-
donment statute may provide this foothold. Although notice and an
opportunity to be heard are required in any determination of aban-
donment, the court in such a proceeding should be free to weigh the
relevant factors and arrive at a solution which best protects the wel-
fare of the child. 00
VII. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE DRAFT AMENDMENTS
Because of the confusion generated by the positioning of the two
separate concepts of Section 9101 and the potential mischief of the one
year limitation on primary rights, the Senate Judiciary Committee has
drafted a suggested amendment to Section 9. The suggested amend-
ment eliminates all references to illegitimacy, presumably making its
custody provisions applicable to married as well as unmarried parents.
The two mandates of the previous Section 9 are still present, but
its reference to the one-year limitation on primary rights is absent. In
place of the one-year limitation, the suggested amendment states:10 2
In any dispute between the natural parent (or parents) of a child and
person (or persons) who have ( 1) commenced adoption proceedings or
who have been granted an order of adoption, and (2) pursuant to court
ment could be issued without notice to the putative father pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.37.010(2) (1963). Assuming such a decree is invalid, the court is not
prevented from finding the father to have abandoned the child in a subsequent pro-
ceeding with proper notice. Second, there was no offsetting interest of the child in
situation stability. The child had not been placed with adoptive parents but con-
tinued in the custody of the foster parents during the entire proceedings. Regardless
of the outcome, the child would have been removed from the foster parents' custody.
99. See Wolverton, New Law leads to Confusion in adoptions, The Seattle Times.
June 17, 1973, atG2, col. 1.
100. The abandonment criteria of In re Lybbert, supra note 91, offer a great
deal more flexibility than the one year primary right rule in the Illegitimate Children
and Parental Rights Act.
101. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
102. WAsHINGTON STATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, suggested draft for amending ch.
134, § 9 [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110 (Supp. 1973). Note the
suggested draft removes all references to illegitimacy. The present language of Sec-
tion 9 can be interpreted to exclude children placed for adoption by married par-
ents, thereby raising equal protection questions under the reasoning of Stanley
(see note 3 supra).
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order or placement by the department of social and health services or
licensed agency have had actual custody of the child before court ac-
tion is commenced by the natural parent (or parents), the court shall
consider above all other considerations the best welfare and interests
of the child, including the child's need for situation stability, in deter-
mining the matter of custody, and the natural parent (or parents) or
person (or persons) who is more fit shall have the superior right to cus-
tody.
This draft amendment wisely indicates that the best interests of the
child should determine .who takes custody rather than an arbitrary one
year period, and it instills needed judicial discretion into all proceed-
ings to vacate adoptions initiated by natural parents.
The Senate Judiciary Committee has suggested adding another sec-
tion which would conclusively presume any natural parent who fails
to declare parenthood prior to his child becoming eight months old to
have wilfully abandoned the child and thereafter be permanently de-
prived of all parental rights. 103 This proposed section would bar a
natural parent, regardless of inadequacy of notice, from attacking the
decree of adoption when his child is more than eight months old. Be-
cause such an irrefutable presumption of abandonment would affect
natural parents whose children have not been placed with adoptive
parents in the same manner as those whose children have been placed
with adoptive parents, this statute is overbroad and cannot be justified
as protecting the best interests of the child. Furthermore, by pre-
suming certain natural parents to be unfit and denying them notice
103. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any child eight months of age or
older, and having a parent who since such child's birth has made no legal decla-
ration of parenthood therefore, shall be deemed to have been wilfully aban-
doned by such parent under circumstances showing a willful substantial lack of
regard for parental obligations; and to insure the welfare of the child is best
served, such parent shall thereafter be permanently deprived of any parental rights
as to such child: PROVIDED, That nothing in this section shall impair liability
for family desertion or nonsupport under chapter 26.20 RCW.
WASHINGTON STATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, suggested draft for amending ch. 134,
[I973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.32 (Supp. 1973). The eight month
time period is considered desirable since most children are placed with adoptive par-
ents pursuant to a six month interlocutory decree when they are approximately two
months old, and the child's eight month birthday will roughly coincide with the fi-
nalization of the adoption. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.120(3) (1963).
Besides presenting constitutional issues under the reasoning of Stanley, an eight
month automatic abandonment period provision might produce detrimental delay in
some adoptions, since by waiting eight months after the child is born, an agency or
natural parent might avoid the necessity of publication.
673
Washington Law Review
and an opportunity to be heard, the new section may give rise to the
same due process questions as in Stanley. 104
VIII. LIABILITY AND BONDS-THE HIGH PRICE
OF PARENTHOOD
Child custody for the unwed father does not come cheaply. Section
11 of the Act requires the putative father to post one hundred dollars
bond for each month the adoptive parents have had custody of the
child prior to a trial on the merits of his claim.t) 5 If the putative fa-
ther or natural mother is successful in overturning the adoption, Sec-
tion 10 imposes on the natural parents liability for "direct and indirect
costs" of supporting the child, including "the value of services ren-
dered by the adoptive parents in caring for the child."'10"
By limiting the availability of a hearing required by the fourteenth
amendment to only those who can afford the high cost of a compensa-
tory bond, the Legislature has embarked on a course of questionable
constitutionality. 10 7 The framers apparently were terrified by the re-
mote possibility of hordes of unwed fathers flooding the courts with
demands for custody of their long adopted children. To protect the
judicial system from all but the "most deserving," the statutory scare-
crows embodied in the economic barriers of Sections 10 and 11 were
erected; they stand as a monument to unjustified trepidation by the
legislature when faced with the necessity of constitutionally mandated
reform.
104. See note 3 supra.
105. Ch. 134, § 11, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.3 10 (Supp.
1973).
106. Ch. 134, § 10, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.300 (Supp.
1973).
107. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); cf. United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). See also Bowman v. Waldt, 9 Wn. App. 562, 513 P.2d
559 (1973). Governor Evans item vetoed Section I 1 stating in a letter to the state
senate:
Section eleven clearly discriminates against those persons who have insufficient
resources to obtain the bond, preventing those persons from even getting into a
court to test the merits of their claim. The random impact of such a provision.
denying only those who have limited resources full access to the courts, deters
the basic function of the judicial system, to decide the issues of a law suit on its
merits.
Letter from Daniel J. Evans, Governor of the State of Washington, to the Senate of
the State of Washington, March 20, 1973, on file with the Washington State Judicial
Council, University of Washington School of Law, No. 72-3-11. The Senate subse-
quently overrode Governor Evans' veto.
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IX. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Underage Parents
Although the Act does not provide guidelines, existing statutory
authority sufficiently deals with problems peculiar to underage par-
ents. Where one" or both parents of an illegitimate child are under
eighteen years of age, the court is required to appoint a guardian ad
litem to investigate the competency of the person, father or mother,
giving the consent and to "certify that the consent was voluntarily
made and for the best interests of the child."' 08 Since a putative father
or natural mother may be subject to charges of carnal knowledge if
the other parent is underage, 09 a special immunity should be adopted
to encourage an underage parent to acknowledge parenthood, consent
to the child's adoption and consequently remove the necessity for pub-
lication.110 If the father of an illegitimate child then wishes to consent
to his child's adoption or to seek custody of his child, he will be able
to do so without fear of prosecution. If he seeks custody and is unfit as
a parent, his rights may be eliminated through deprivation, during filia-
tion or by a finding of abandonment."1
B. Soldiers and Sailors
The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 requires a plain-
tiff seeking a default judgment to file an affidavit stating that the defen-
dant is not in the military service. 21 2 If the defendant is in the military
service, and he does not receive actual notice of the judicial action, a
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.070(2) (1963). The wording of the Subsection
does not distinguish between unwed mothers and unwed fathers. The equal protection
reasoning of Stanley, see note 3 supra, requires that unwed fathers as well as unwed
mothers have the benefit of a guardian ad litem.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1963).
110. Such a statute might state: "Where the minor parent of an illegitimate child
has relinquished the child in writing, the other parent of the child may acknowledge
parenthood with immunity from prosecution under R.C.W. 9.79.020."
I11. See notes 10-13 and 90-100 and accompanying text supra and 126-
130 and accompanying text infra.
112. 50 U.S.C. § 520(1) (1970). Id., § 3 also states:
In any action or proceeding in which a person in military service is a party
if such party does not personally appear therein or is not represented by an
authorized attorney, the court may appoint an attorney to represent him . ...
But no attorney appointed under this Act . . . shall have power to waive any
right of the person for whom he is appointed or bind him by his acts.
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default judgment rendered in his absence is voidable. ' 13 The Soldiers
and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940 probably applies to a putative
father who fails to appear at an adoption show cause hearing to deter-
mine the necessity of his consent.' " 4 Should an adoption decree be
rendered without his consent, the decree may be open to attack unless
the putative father has waived his rights under the Act,' ' vested full
power of representation with his attorney,"16 has no meritorious de-
fense" 7 or was not prejudiced in defending the action because of his
military service.' 18
If the putative father receives actual notice by personal service and
has an opportunity but fails to appear, his rights can be extinguish-
ed.' ':' Should he receive only constructive notice,' 20 the decree will prob-
ably remain subject to attack until the adoptive parents have had cus-
tody for one year and the primary right of the natural parent no
longer exists.' 2 ' Once notified, the putative father or natural mother
may be granted a stay in the proceedings until a more convenient
opportunity to appear is available.'22 Long delays, however, need not
be tolerated if harmful to the best interests of the child.' 23
113. See Allen v. Allen, 30 Cal. 2d 433, 182 P.2d 551 (1947) (default judgment
rendered in serviceman's absence is voidable but not void).
114. In re Adoption of a Minor, 155 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1946): In re Adoption
of a Minor, 136 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
115. McMahon v. McMahon, 70 Cal. App. 2d 126, 160 P.2d 892 (1945) (de-
fendant waived all rights under the Act and stipulated action might be heard as a
default).
116. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 63 Wn. 2d 709, 388 P.2d 942 (1964). See also
note 112 supra.
117. 50 U.S.C. § 520(4) (1970) (default judgment rendered in serviceman's
absence may be reopened within 90 days after termination from the service
providing it appears that such person was prejudiced in making his defense and had a
meritorious or legal defense to the action).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Cf. Melotti v. Melotti, 44 D. & C. 514, 5 Fay. L.J. 117, 4 Monroe L.R.
56, 11 Som. 51, 56 York 76 (Pa. 1942) (under Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act. a
divorce will not be granted on service by publication unless the record contains facts
showing the respondent is not in the military service).
121. See note 125 infra.
122. 50 U.S.C. § 521 (1970).
123. Trevino v. Trevino, 193 S.W.2d 254 (Ct. of Civ. App. Tex. 1946); In re
Stromberg's Adoption, 58 N.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. Ohio 1944).
The services maintain centralized personnel locators making the task of determining
whether a named putative father is presently in the military and if so, where he is
stationed, somewhat less burdensome. United States Army: World Wide Locator, Chief
A. G., Personnel Systems Branch, P.O. Box 7867, Rincon Annex, (Presidio) San
Francisco, Calif. 94119, ph. 415-561-5018. United States Air Force: Airforce World
Wide Locator, Randolph Airforce Base, Texas 78148, ph. 512-652-5774. United
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A difficult situation arises when the mother of an illegitimate child
refuses to name or cannot name a putative father who is known to be
in the military. If published notice fails to reach the father and he
later becomes cognizant of his child, he may be successful in vacating
the decree of adoption rendered in his absence. A finding of abandon-
ment may provide some protection to adoptive parents,'2 4 but the
Act's one-year limitation on primary rights is a more impenetrable
shield. 125 Until the adoptive parents have had custody for the required
year, however, adoptions of illegitimate children of unknown military
personnel will be somewhat more tentative than normal adoptions.
C. Deprivation and Permanent Dependency
The Act does not expressly apply to a permanent deprivation or
permanent dependency action brought pursuant to the Juvenile Court
Act.' 26 The Supreme Court's holding in Stanley clearly indicates,
however, that both parents of an abandoned illegitimate child are en-
titled to all rights of due process and equal protection.127 Consequently,
where the state seeks to have an illegitimate child previously deter-
mined a ward of the court declared permanently dependent, 128 both
unwed fathers and unwed mothers must receive notice and an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate that the child is not dependent. Furthermore,
where one parent is found unfit and permanently deprived of custody,129
the other parent still retains primary right to possession of the child. 130
States Navy: Dept. of Navy, Bureau of Personnel, Enlisted Locator, Airlington Annex,
Washington D.C. 20370, ph. (last names beginning with A-Gn) 202-694-2925, (Go-
N) 202-694-1527, (O-Z) 202-694-2072.
124. See notes 90-100 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra. But see 50 U.S.C. § 525
(1970) and Zitomer v. Holdsworth, 449 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1971) (statute of limita-
tions tolled by military service). However, the one year limitation on the putative
father's primary right is not a statute of limitations. The one year limitation affects a
putative father's status but not his right to bring suit. The change of the putative
father's status vis-&-vis the child derives from the presumption that the child's interest
in stability has greatly increased after it has been with adoptive parents for one year.
It does not deprive the putative father of rights nor attempt to bar him from attack-
ing the decree; it merely deprives him of any presumption that the child's best interests
lie in his custody.
126. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 13.04 (1963).
127. See note 3 supra.
128. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1963).
129. See note 24 supra.
130. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
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The primary right can only be removed when the state successfully
demonstrates the remaining unmarried parent unfit.
D. Bogeymen-Rapists, Adulterers and Artificial Inseminators
The question of whether a mother who has been impregnated by a
rapist is required to publish notice to an unknown putative father con-
tinually arises in commentary about the Act.' 31 The issue requires
little attention. First, in reality the question will seldom arise. Even
those mothers whose religious or moral beliefs generally forbid
morning-after birth control or abortion are likely to find it morally
permissible to use one of these methods to escape a pregnancy re-
sulting from rape. If a natural mother should prefer to give birth to
the child of her assaulter and relinquish it for adoption, a police re-
port or a report from a rape relief organization dated contempora-
neously with the child's probable conception period and indicating
that the mother was the victim of rape would certainly suffice as evi-
dence for dispensing with the requirement of notice to the putative
father.' 32 It safely can be assumed that neither Stanley nor the Act
were addressed to protecting the interests of rapists. Furthermore, it
strains the imagination to conceive of a rapist appearing at a show
cause hearing only to be arrested and taken into custody.
Another unlikely issue stems from artificial insemination. A child
resulting from artificial insemination might be treated by the courts as
illegitimate.1 3 3 If so, the biological father's consent may be required
should the donee parents attempt to adopt and legitimize the child.
Requiring a donor to consent in advance to the adoption of the child
will eliminate the necessity of notice during adoption proceedings sub-
sequent to the birth of the child. When a donor father has not consent-
ed in advance, his consent no doubt can be implied from the act of
donation and the notice requirement deemed to be waived. Should a
donor father attack an existing decree, implied consent, the one-year
131. See Wolverton, Whon does new adoption law protect?, The Seattle Times.
June 19, 1973, at C4, col. 7. See also Honeywell, supra note 38, at 26.
132. Because of the great potential for abuse, some evidence, other than the
mother's word, is necessary to verify that she has been raped. A report from police
files or from the files of a rape relief organization is undisputable.
133. See Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406(1963) (dictum). But
see People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968) (dictum).
See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1103 (1969).
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limitation on primary rights'34 or an ex post facto finding of abandon-
ment 135 may protect the adoptive parents and child. It should be noted,
however, that in the unlikely event a donor father decides to seek cus-
tody of his child, the anonymity which physicians and sperm banks
maintain will normally preclude him from determining the whereabouts
of the child and attacking the decree.
Another nonissue arises when a married mother gives birth to an
illegitimate child. Although the common law presumes that such
children are legitimate, 136 the Act may require that they be treated as
illegitimate for the purposes of adoption. 37 As with artificial insemi-
nation and rape, the issue probably will seldom arise. When married
parents relinquish a child for adoption, an acknowledgment of pa-
ternity signed by the mother's husband along with his consent should
be sufficient to establish the presumption that a putative father'is not
lurking in the background. If the husband refuses to sign the acknowl-
edgement, the child should be treated as illegitimate and the mother
asked to name the real father or publish notice. 138
134. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 90-100 and accompanying text supra.
136. In re a Minor, 29 Wn. 2d 759, 189 P.2d 458 (1948).
137. Although the Act is presently silent on the issue (but see note 138 infra for
Judiciary Committee draft amendment),, a putative father who impregnates a married
woman should not be deprived of notice of his child's adoption. The natural father of
the illegitimate child of a married mother retains his primary right to custody of his
child. See ch. 134, § 9, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.110 (Supp.
1973). Consequently he retains the right to prove paternity and attack a decree of
adoption, even though he is denied notice and an opportunity to be heard by the
presumption of ligitimacy. Although no statistics are available, it can be assumed
that a significant proportion of children relinquished by married parents are illegiti-
mate. By presuming these children to be legitimate, the purposes of the Illegitimate
Children and Parental Rights Act--extending notice to putative fathers and protect-
ing adoptions from subsequent attacks from putative fathers-will be defeated.
Absent an affirmative acknowledgement of paternity by the married father, use of
the presumption of legitimacy is of questionable constitutional propriety. By requir-
ing an unmarried mother to produce a written acknowledgement from a putative
father to avoid publication but neglecting to require the married mother to do the
same, the presumption discriminates against unmarried mothers. It also discriminates
against illegitimate children relinquished by married mothers in that it denies them
both access to their putative father prior to the adoption and a safe and unassailable
adoption once the decree is rendered. Furthermore, use of the presumption of legiti-
macy has the effect of presuming all putative fathers who impregnate married women
to be unfit for custody and thus not entitled to notice of the adoption of their chil-
dren; they consequently are denied due process and equal protection under the reason-
ing of Stanley. See note 3 supra.
138. The Judiciary Committee has proposed that "the biological father of a child
whose biological mother is married,:to some other person at the time df conception
and/or birth . . ." should not be entitled to rights of notice under the Act "if the
legal presumption of parenthood has not been overcome, unless such a biological
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Should a putative father appear after the child has been relin-
quished pursuant to the husband's acknowledgment, he will have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy in a filiation pro-
ceeding. 13:) If he is successful in proving his paternity and is not found
to have abandoned the child,14 0 and the adoptive parents have not
had custody for more than one year, 4 1 the decree of adoption may be
vacated and custody awarded to the natural father. It is extremely un-
likely, however, that a putative father will risk prosecution for adul-
tery or a tort action brought by the mother's husband for criminal con-
versation 142 by proving paternity in a filiation proceeding and then suc-
cessfully transgress the nearly impossible obstacle course of vacating
an adoption to gain custody of his child.
X. STRANGE BOUNDARIES, AS YET UNDISCERNIBLE
The Act may be the most controversial piece of legislation to be
passed in 1973. Although many critics of the Act concede that the
father of an illegitimate child who has contributed to the child's sup-
port and served in a paternal role should be accorded the right to cus-
tody, few are willing to extend published notice to all biological fa-
thers. Citing the Act as an example of "legislative overkill,"'143 critics
contend that by applying notice requirements to adoption and cus-
father has been adjudicated the natural father in a filiation proceeding, or has in
writing, acknowledged his parenthood." WASHINGTON STATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
suggested draft for amending ch. 134, [1973] Wash. Laws, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.32
(Supp. 1973). This suggested language suffers from the same maladies as the pre-
sumption of legitimacy (see note 137 supra).
139. It is only when a putative father asserts paternity when the married father
has already acknowledged, that the presumption of legitimacy should have some
relevancy. A putative father should have to prove paternity under these circumstances
by "clear and convincing evidence," presumably more than by a conflicting acknowl-
edgement of paternity. In re a Minor, 29 Wn. 2d 759, 764, 189 P.2d 458, 460 (1948).
Consequently a filiation proceeding is the most appropriate forum to present evidence
and obtain the necessary judicial decree to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
140. See notes 90-100 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
142. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.110 (1963) (adultery is punishable by im-
prisonment for up to two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000). In Washington,
however, prosecutions for adultery have been infrequent and no adultery case has
reached the state supreme court since 1923. L. RIEKE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 148
(1972-73). Note that a putative father who is successful in proving paternity is
exposing himself to alienation of affection or criminal conversation actions brought by
the mother's husband. See Bernier v. Kochopulos, 37 Wn. 2d 305, 223 P.2d 205
(1950) (defining alienation of affections and criminal conversation).
143. Brown, Rights in illegitimacy cases debated, The Seattle Times. April 29,
1973, at A19, col. 4.
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tody, the Act goes farther than the factual situation in Stanley T4
merits and sacrifices the interests of the child, the interests of the
adoption agencies and the interests of the unwed mother to the fre-
quently nonexistent interests of unfit putative fathers.
Proponents argue that the interests of adoption agencies are irrele-
vant, that the notice requirements of the Act are constitutionally nec-
essary, that the child's best interests are served by secure and unassail-
able adoptions rendered in conformity with all requirements of due
process (including notice and an opportunity to be heard), that natural
mothers have no right to privacy which is invaded by publication, and
that the best interests of the child may even be furthered by giving
custody to the natural father.' 45
It may be useful to clear the air surrounding these issues. First, the
Act is legally sound. There is some latitude to argue that Stanley ap-
plies only to dependency and deprivation and not to adoption and
custody,' 46 but until the Court decides these issues on the merits, the
144. See note 3 supra.
145. If Stanley is examined in the context of the child's best interests, a different
pattern emerges. The case is more than an explicit delimitation of the rights of puta-
tive fathers; it is an implicit recognition that the best interests of a child are often
served by being in the custody of its natural parents. The Court did not state this
directly but its language necessitates the implication:
For its part, the State has made its interest quite plain: Illinois has declared
that the aim of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect "the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the com-
munity" and to "strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing
him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the pro-
tection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal ....
What is the State interest in separating children from fathers without a hearing
designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case?
We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it
separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father,
the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from
his family. (emphasis added)
405 U.S. at 652-53. By implicitly recognizing the doctrine of parental preference and
applying it to unwed fathers, the Court has embarked on a highly controversial
course. For a discussion of parental preference as applied to unwed fathers in Cali-
fornia, see Comment, Custody Rights of Unwed Fathers, 4 PACIFic L.J. 922, 932
(1973). See also Comment, Plight of the Putative Father in California Child Custody
Proceedings: A Problem of Equal Protection, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1973).
A finding that an illegitimate child's best interests is with its natural father in the
same manner that a legitimate child's best interests is presumed to be with its legal
father would be consistent with the Supreme Court's recent equal protection holdings
involving illigitimacy. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisianna, 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surity Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); but see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532(1971).
146. See note 3 supra. Stanley's children were found permanently dependent pur-
suant to provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37 (1965).
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better view, based on subsequent United States Supreme Court per
curiam decisions and state supreme court decisions, 147 is that the no-
tice requirements of Stanley are also applicable to adoption and cus-
tody. Because the effects of an incorrect interpretation of Stanley
could place hundreds of adoptions in jeopardy, it is wiser to engage in
legislative overkill than to risk a determination which might affect
detrimentally the welfare of adopted children. Second, assuming the
Court's reasoning in Stanley is applicable to adoptions, the interests
of the adoption agencies are totally irrelevant. The additional cost of
notifying putative fathers is simply a necessary element of securing a
valid adoption. In Stanley, similar interests were weighed by the Su-
preme Court, and the father's right to custody found to be worth the
additional expense.148
Third, no decision to date has recognized a natural mother's right
to privacy. If such a privacy right exists, it will have to be weighed
against the potential right of a putative father. Fourth, there is no evi-
dence that putative fathers who seek custody of their children are less
fit than natural mothers who seek custody of their children. Those
putative fathers who are unfit may be deprived of custody just as may
unfit natural mothers.
The only issue which requires serious examination involves the ef-
fects of notice by publication on the best interests of the child. If time
is crucial to the well being of the adoptive child 14-1 and if locating pu-
tative fathers or requiring publication causes an additional delay; if by
147. See notes 4 and 64 supra.
148. The Supreme Court rejected the administrative convenience argument as
applied to putative fathers in Stanley:
[T] he establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate ends
is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But
the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may charac-
terize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.
405 U.S. at 656-57.
149. Prompt placement serves both the child's need for early parental care and
the natural desire of the adoptive parents to begin caring for the child soon after
birth. In addition, by reducing the necessity of interim foster care facilities in
either private homes or institutions, early placement minimizes the chances of
detrimental psychological effects on the child arising from repeated and sudden
changes in the environment.
The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley, supra note 32, at 517.
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requiring notice by publication, natural mothers are motivated to
leave the state and jeopardize the validity of their child's adoption; if
the number of private and black market adoptions is increased as a
result of publication; and if mothers who would otherwise relinquish
are being motivated to keep their children when the best interests of
the child lie with adoption, then the necessity of notice must be reex-
amined. To date, there is no evidence that the statute is adding a sig-
nificant amount of additional time to the adoptive process 150 and
there is no evidence of a decrease in relinquishments' 51 or an increase
in escape or black market and private adoptions; however, these vari-
ables must continually be reexamined and marginal infringements on
the welfare of the child treated with deference. Time will be the ulti-
mate judge of the wisdom of the policies behind the Illegitimate
Children and Parental Rights Act and of the "strange boundaries, as
yet undiscernible"'152 of Stanley v. Illinois.
Andrew C. Gauen
150. If a putative father who is unfit as a parent appears at a show cause hearing,
a delay of several months may result while the court or agency seeks to permanently
deprive him of his rights to the child. If a putative father who is a fit parent appears
at a show cause hearing, then the Act is operating as intended; however, some delay
must be anticipated before the putative father receives custody.
151. Any statistics showing a decrease in relinquishments will be clouded because
of the trend, beginning prior to Stanley, of more and more unwed mothers keeping
their children instead of relinquishing them for adoption and because of the declining
birth rate. D. HOROWITZ & T. WILLHITE, WASH. ATr'Y GEN. INFORMAL REPORT, PUTA-
TIVE FATHERS AND STANLEY V. ILLINOIS-DEPT. OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES
POLICY 10 (Oct. 4, .1972).
152. 405 U.S. at 668 (Burger & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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